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INTRODUCTION: TERM EXTENSION TENNIS
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), negotiated
and enforced by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), sets the international norm for
copyright terms. Article 9.1 requires compliance with the provisions of the Berne Convention,
which in article 7.1 sets the life of the author plus 50 years as the general term for works
protected under the Berne Convention, and provides for terms of 50 years for certain other
categories of work. Article 12 of TRIPS sets 50 years as the minimum term of protection for
all works where the term is not calculated based on the life of a natural person.2
This minimum threshold, however, does not prevent states from setting a longer term. In
the 1990s, certain European jurisdictions extended their basic term, ostensibly to deal with
the complications of World War II. Germany and Austria, for example, passed blanket 20-year
extensions to all copyright terms, regardless of when the author dies. In 1998, the United
States followed the European lead, extending its basic term to life plus 70. The motivation of
the United States was said to be harmonisation with its European partners. That explanation
is obviously incomplete, as the 1998 law actually increased disharmony in some of the most
important categories of works.3 A second motivation was to avoid the consequences of the
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European Union’s (EU’s) “rule of the shorter term”, which, contrary to the non-discrimination
principle of Berne, gives foreign copyright holders less protection in Europe than Europeans
get if the term of protection in the foreign author’s jurisdiction is shorter than the EU term.4
Both reasons accord with the general view within the United States favouring intellectual
property maximisation – the idea that if some intellectual property protection is good, then
more and stronger intellectual property protection must be better.
Whatever the reason initially for its extension of terms, the United States has now taken
the lead to push for the extension of terms globally. Australia, for example, recently agreed to
increase its term from life plus 50 years to life plus 70 years as a consequence of the free trade
agreement (FTA) with the US Trade Representative. The Australian Parliament had already
dismissed a proposal from local industry interests to increase the term in 2000.5 This decision
was reversed not by Parliament but by government trade negotiators.6
South Africa, as part of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), has recently been
engaged in FTA negotiations with the United States (Business Day, 2005). The US has once
again placed the term of copyright on the negotiating table. As the largest economy in SACU
by several orders of magnitude, South Africa is the senior partner in SACU. South Africa has
a responsibility to consider the impact of changes to its intellectual property law not only on
the majority of previously disadvantaged persons within South Africa but also on the other
developing countries in SACU – Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland.
Although Africa imports only a tiny proportion of the cultural goods (the subject of
intellectual property rights) in the world, it exports even less.7 Africa is a net importer of
cultural goods, spending scarce foreign exchange resources on them. Extending copyright
terms may tend to increase this imbalance. South Africa’s economic role in Africa and
leadership in the African Union (AU) raise a domestic decision to continental importance.
South Africa is subject to economic pressure presciently predicted 10 years ago: 
As the United States and members of the European Union are South Africa’s most important
trading partners, it may well be that South Africa will also eventually extend its copyright
protection terms to 70 years from the death of the author (Wendland & Baillee, 1996: 167). 
While the FTA negotiations have been discontinued (Business Day, 2006), the same
issues will arise in future rounds of talks, and South Africa will once again have to consider
the US demand to increase terms. It will have to weigh carefully the cost of the American
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4 See Goldstein, P (2001) International copyright: Principles, law, and practice, § 5.3 at 239.
5 See www.ipcr.gov.au/, accessed 15 October 2005.
6 See www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us.html, accessed 15 October 2005.
7 According to UNESCO (2005), Africa imports only 1% of the cultural goods in the global market, but exports even
less, 0.4%; from UNESCO (2005) International flows of selected cultural goods and services, 1994-2003, UNESCO
Institute for Statistics, Montreal: Figure 5 on p. 23 and Figure 5 on p. 21.
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proposal. Even if term extension cannot be avoided, there are obvious ways to minimise its
cost. In this article, we introduce one such way. 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT
The current term of copyright in South Africa for literary, musical, and artistic works is the
life of the author plus 50 years.8 The term is 50 years for cinematographic films, photographs,
computer programs, sound recordings, broadcasts, programme carrying signals, published
editions, and anonymous and pseudonymous works.9
As Owen Dean, an intellectual property lawyer, writes, the term is already generous,
particularly when compared to the terms for patents (20 years) and trademarks (15 years): 
The period afforded to the owner of copyright in a work for controlling the use of his work
and deriving remuneration from it – in other words the duration of copyright – is a very
generous one (Dean, 2003).10
Patents and trademarks, unlike copyright, also require registration for any intellectual
property right to exist.
The rationale for intellectual property generally, and copyright in particular, is to
increase the availability and quality of creative endeavours for the common good. Copyright
and patent statutes create a set of exclusive rights that allow commercial exploitation of the
creation for a limited period. These exclusive rights are intended to act as incentives to
creativity, as a potential reward for works. They are also intended to operate as a
mechanism that allows those engaged in creativity, whether musicians or inventors, to
garner a livelihood from creativity, thus allowing them to devote themselves full-time to
creative endeavour.
The objective of these statutory monopolies is that society benefits from the creative
activity the statutes are meant to support. The statutory monopoly is notionally a limited
monopoly, limited in scope and in duration. The scope of copyright is limited by fair dealing
and the general exceptions.11 What is not often realised is that the scope is also limited to
the rights listed in the statute – other uses of the work are not regulated and anyone can
do them freely. So no one requires permission to read a book, or to read a book aloud, or
to write in the margins of her own book, or even to burn her own book. Also, the exclusive
rights apply only to acts done to the whole or a substantial part of a work. For example,
any copying which is of less than a substantial part of a work is not an infringement. It
does not require a fair dealing exception. It is simply free.
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8 Section 3(2)(a) of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978. Works that are not available during the author's lifetime are subject
to copyright for 50 years from publication (s 3(2)(b)).
9 Copyright Act, s 3(2) (b)- (f).
10 See Dean (2003: 1-31).
11 Copyright Act, ss 12-19B.
022 31 SAJIC 02.qxd  2006/12/02  07:24 AM  Page 24
When the term of copyright expires, a work becomes part of the public domain. Anyone
may then make any use of it without the author’s permission. The public domain is the
repository of the collective creative endeavours of humanity. Copyright exists to generate new
work for the public domain. 
Unlike patents and trademarks, the exclusive rights given by copyright arise as soon as
an original work is created. This happens at any time that anyone makes any work that is
“original” in any material form. Original in this context just means that it is the result of
independent effort. Material form includes digital data.12 So as soon as anyone makes
something that is not a mere copy of someone else’s work, an idle doodling on a page, for
example, the law immediately gives that person a whole range of rights in that work, and
prohibits other people from using the work. These extensive rights arise automatically and
without any formalities. Some uses of the doodle could result in criminal penalties. Under the
current system, if the doodle is made by someone who is 25 at the time the work is made, it
will be protected until the creator’s death, let us say at 75, and then another 50 years – an
automatic 100-year monopoly.
How did South Africa, a developing country struggling with massive adult illiteracy (16%
of the population, some seven million people, have had no schooling),13 with profound
unemployment and development issues to contend with, acquire its copyright regime,
including the current extensive term? As with so many other largely unexamined aspects of
South African society, South Africa was given its copyright regime by its colonial masters.
The first law to grant copyright in South Africa was a Batavian Republic statute in 1803
when the Dutch governed the Cape Colony. A little later the Transvaal and Free State
Republics acquired their own instruments, copied from European precedents, as did the
British colonies of the Cape and Natal.
In 1911, Britain passed a copyright statute – the Copyright Act of 1911, which became
known as the Imperial Copyright Act, as it was passed, at least in part, to protect the rights
of British authors in the colonies. The Act was also intended to enact the provisions of the
Berne Treaty agreed at the Berlin Conference in 1907. This Act applied directly to the imperial
Dominions including South Africa. 
These imperial acts followed a long tradition of copyright in Britain. That tradition was
initially motivated by a strong desire to limit the scope of publishing monopolies. The first
copyright statute in England, the Statute of Anne of 1710, aimed to restrict the effective
term of copyright. Before that statute, publishers believed they had a perpetual right to
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12 Copyright Act, s 2(2).
13 A further 37% of South Africans have not completed secondary school (16 million people). See Census 2001: Key
results, http://statsa.gov.za/census01, accessed 17 February 2005.
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control the publication of their works. After the Statute of Anne, that control was to be
limited. It took 64 years before the express limits within the Statute of Anne were confirmed
by the House of Lords. But when they were, for the first time in British history, works
entered a public domain.
Many of the provisions of the current South African legislation are ultimately descended
from the 1911 British Copyright Act, which was formally incorporated into South African law
by the South African Patent, Trademarks, Designs and Copyright Act 9 of 1916. Subsequently,
the Copyright Act 63 of 1965 closely followed the Copyright Act 1956 in the United Kingdom.
The current Copyright Act 98 of 1978 was passed by the apartheid government. Although it
has been amended nine times, these amendments have been largely technical amendments,
primarily in response to international developments. 
The most astonishing feature of the current copyright regime in South Africa cannot be
found anywhere in the text of the Act. The history and policy debates around the Act are
utterly oblivious to the urgent issues of illiteracy, semi-literacy and unemployment which
burden millions of South Africans. 
In contrast to other former colonies, the United States, upon independence from Britain,
did not grant copyright to works protected by the imperial power, or any other foreign power.
The United States law instead protected only maps, charts, and books authored in the United
States, and then only for a brief 14 years, with a possible 14-year extension.14 This protection
extended to works by Americans only. Until 1891, the United States did not extend copyright
protection to foreign authors at all. In this sense, the United States was born a pirate nation.
It justified its piracy on the basis of its status as a developing nation.
THE COSTS OF TERM EXTENSION
Copyright creates obvious benefits. By giving creators an exclusive right to exploit their creative
work, copyright produces incentives to create that the market otherwise would not provide. 
These incentives are fundamental to the growth and spread of culture. Obviously, many
would create whether or not there was copyright protection. But equally obviously, some
would not. Some creators require the opportunity economically to exploit their creative work
– for without that opportunity, they could not afford the costs of creation. A filmmaker, for
example, creating a US$2 million film ordinarily needs an opportunity economically to exploit
that work, if only to cover the costs of producing that film. If competitors could simply take her
creative work, copy it, and sell it, the creator’s opportunity to recover costs would be reduced.
Copyright is thus a promise to the creator to give her a chance to exploit her work, so as to
give the creator an incentive to create.
Such incentives, however, obviously only operate prospectively. We cannot give an
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incentive today to produce creative work yesterday. Thus, any incentive-related gains from
copyright are prospective only.
But copyright also creates cost. As with any monopoly right, copyright restricts the flow of
information, and artificially elevates the cost of information and culture. The aim of any
rational copyright policy must be to balance the costs against the benefits.
Term extension has its own mix of benefits and costs. These differ substantially depending
upon whether the extension applies to existing copyrighted works or to future works only. 
If the extension applies prospectively only, then both the present benefits and present
costs are slight. This is because both the benefits and the costs will be borne many years in
the future, and properly to reckon those benefits and costs, the costs and benefits must be
discounted. In the current South African context, the United States is demanding that South
Africa extend its term from life plus 50 years to life plus 70 years. The present benefit of that
extension is the added incentive to create that the extension would produce. 
That benefit is tiny. As Justice Stephen Breyer estimated in Eldred v Ashcroft,15 “a 1%
likelihood of earning [US]$100 annually for 20 years, starting 75 years into the future, is worth
less than seven cents today.” This is because the value of money in the future is less than the
value of that money today. Likewise could we calculate the expected costs of the extension,
but for our purposes, we will assume that those costs are zero. 
If the extension applies to existing copyright, however, the calculus is very different.
Again, in the current South African context, a term extension of existing works would reach
back to 1956 at least. For works from that period that continue to be commercially available,
the benefit to the copyright owner is simply the present value of those royalties for 20 years
into the future. So, for example, at a 5% discount rate, a 20-year royalty of US$1,000 a year is
worth about US$12,500 today. 
The benefits from an extension of existing copyright (to the copyright owner, at least) are,
therefore, quite substantial. So, too, are the costs. For in addition to taxing the public for the
increased royalties that it otherwise would not have paid, term extension of existing copyright
substantially inhibits access to works that are not currently commercially available. The vast
majority of work created 50 years ago is no longer commercially accessible. Yet term
extension would burden access to these works by requiring anyone who would use, or remix,
these works to secure permission from the author. But again, because the work is not
commercially available, it is extremely costly to locate the author (or, of course, her successor
in title). So the vast majority of these works are “orphaned” by term extension.
There are obviously other costs as well. Term extension extends the monopoly over a
particular creative work. Those monopolies keep the cost of such creativity above
competitive prices. They also continue the need for expensive licensing of creative work.
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They finally restrict the opportunity to produce competing editions, or versions, of popular
creative works. As a quick visit to Amazon.com will attest, there are many editions of works
in the public domain very competitively priced. Works still under copyright do not offer such
range or savings.
These costs are particularly significant in the South African context. Term extension for
existing works significantly interferes with the ability of society to make transformative use
of works. A particular set of transformative use involves challenging hegemonic accounts of
history and life through rewriting archetypal narratives. The genre of re-appropriative works
is important to any open society but vitally important to a newly free society such as South
Africa still struggling with the legacy of apartheid.
JM Coetzee’s Foe, a rejoinder to Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, illustrates how this
strategy engages the past. It subverts the colonial myth of the benevolent master and “Man
Friday”, an archetypal noble savage. In Foe, Friday’s tongue is cut; he cannot speak and tell
his own tale, symbolising the silencing of alternative discourses by the dominant colonial
narrative. Coetzee could write the novel without fear of a copyright suit, as Robinson Crusoe
was published in 1719, and Defoe died in 1731, long before current lengthy copyright terms. 
There are, however, many works still under copyright which tinge colonialism and even life
under apartheid with nostalgia. Rudyard Kipling and Rider Haggard manufactured
archetypes of bold white adventurers and loyal native servants, a tradition continued by some
writers still alive at present, such as the London-based South African author Wilbur Smith.
How long will it be before contemporary works are available for appropriate rejoinder? Term
extension threatens unduly to delay the urgent reworking of hegemonic discourses in a
society still shaped by colonial and racist oppression. Critical engagement with the founding
stories of society helps create a substantively democratic and egalitarian culture (Saint-
Amour, 2003: 207-220).
This difference in the benefits and costs of prospective term extension, and the extension
of existing terms, is a clue to the real motivation behind these extensions. In the United States,
in particular, copyright holders for many old works pushed to extend the term of existing
copyrights. By contrast, there was no one seriously arguing that extending terms
prospectively would increase present incentives. 
A COMPROMISE – RENEW ONLY IF REGISTER
Extending existing copyright terms benefits a small minority of existing copyright holders; it
significantly burdens the rest of society. That burden invites policy makers to explore
alternatives that might mitigate some of this harm. We propose a simple technique to
minimise the harm from extending existing terms: the only works whose terms can be
extended are those that register to secure the benefit of that extension.
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Just such a compromise – that any extension should be limited to those copyright holders
who take steps to claim the extension – is being debated by Westminster in the UK.16
Under this rule, authors of existing works seeking to benefit from an extension of term
must take affirmative action to secure that benefit. A simple registration with a token fee
would be enough to separate works needing the benefit of a longer term from works that do
not. And as the vast majority of works have no continuing commercial life, there would be
relatively few registrations to consider.
Such a proposal does not deprive authors of anything they otherwise would have had. In
fact, the proposed extension would grant authors a 20-year term they otherwise would not
have had. A simple registration is hardly a burden to demand in exchange for these
additional 20 years. Nor would the proposal deprive future authors of any right, as it applies
only to copyrights of works already in existence.
This slight modification would then significantly narrow the burden of term extension,
while not depriving those who would otherwise benefit of any substantial right. It would also
significantly expand the range of works in the public domain. In the United States, when re-
registration was a requirement, up to 90% of certain kinds of works were never reregistered.
For those works, the relatively trivial burden of registration was greater than the value of an
extended copyright term.
This proposal raises a question under Berne, but we believe that question is easily
answered. Berne forbids formalities operating as conditions to minimum copyright protection.
The requirement of registration to get the benefits of an additional 20-year term might be
thought to contradict that requirement. But this requirement applies to secure the benefit of
copyright protection that is beyond the minimum required by TRIPS and Berne. The
requirement could, therefore, not deprive any author of the minimum protection required by
Berne. Alternatively, it is possible to except foreign works from the registration requirement.
That would still enable a significant number of South African works to enter the public
domain, without raising any question under international law.
Registration is not foreign to South African law. The 1916 Copyright Act, for example, had
a registration provision. When a work was registered it created a presumption of notice that
the work was under copyright. In any dispute about copyright, the person accused of
infringement could claim that she did not know the work was subject to copyright, nor could
she reasonably have known that. Registration prevented people from raising this defence,
because they were presumed to have known. Since copyright was primarily aimed at potential
re-printers of books rather than ordinary people, registration did not impose too heavy a
burden on ordinary users of works.
29
the southern african journal of information and communication issue 7 2006
16 See Lessig (2006) Those sensible British, Lessig blog, 18 May, www.lessig.org/blog/archives/003403.shtml
022 31 SAJIC 02.qxd  2006/12/02  07:25 AM  Page 29
Recent statutes have also relied upon registration provisions. The Copyright in
Cinematograph Films Act 62 of 1977 currently allows registration for the additional benefit of
evidence – registration constitutes prima facie evidence that the registrant is the owner or
licensee of copyright in the cinematograph film.17 It does not require registration for the
vesting of copyright but rather for the benefit of proof. 
In both these instances, registration is required to obtain an additional benefit of
protection. In the same vein, the registration requirement we have proposed would enable an
author or her successors in title to secure a benefit beyond the benefit originally promised.
Such a registration system could exploit the efficiencies of digital technology to lower the
burden of registration significantly. Just as the Internet’s domain name system has created
competing registrars who feed a single domain-name registry, a system of copyright
registration could permit many different registrars to compete to provide low-cost registry
services to authors. Some of these registrars could provide web-based registration services.
Others could offer paper-based registration that would be aggregated electronically. In either
case, the system should not be expensive, and in no case need it be complex. 
Registration need not impose a significant burden either on limited government resources
or on those with an interest in registering works for an extension of copyright term. An online
registration process would reduce costs. CIPRO, the South African government agency that
registers patents and trademarks, is already in the process of transition to an online registry.
Registration of copyright for term extension would simply require another online register and
a marginal increase in the costs. 
One possible criticism of requiring registration for term extension is that it is precisely
the most marginalised persons in South African society for whom even the barest
formalities will pose the most significant barrier. The works that are due to expire, and
thus are in need of registration, are most likely to be owned by corporations, especially
international corporations. Due to the same historical processes which disadvantaged
many South Africans, there are few instances in which previously disadvantaged people
hold copyright in works due to expire. In those few instances where historically
disadvantaged persons hold copyright about to expire, it can be argued that the works in
question are of such cultural importance that available non-profit resources will ensure
their protection. 
CONCLUSION
Copyright is regulation. As with any regulation, it imposes costs. As with some, it creates
benefits. But as with any regulation of speech, it is important that legislators narrowly tailor
such regulation to avoid unnecessary burdens on speech.
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The push by the United States to secure longer terms for copyright in South Africa is
driven primarily by the interests of American authors. Whether those interests are legitimate
or not, we have proposed a simple qualification to term extension that would substantially
reduce its burden. 
Developing nations are particularly burdened by overly extended intellectual property
laws. South Africa could provide an example to the world of a way to reduce this burden
without blocking the objective of authors to secure a longer copyright term. 
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